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I. INTRODUCTION
"[T]he most important relationship in the lives of most Americans,
so far as economic security is concerned, is their own actual or
potential employment relationship, with government and family
serving as back-up systems."' If this theory is true, it would seem to
follow that more than a handshake between an employer and new
employee would be required to signify and solidify their employment
relationship.' However, the reality is that employment relationships
are often created by handshakes and introductions, rather than by
written employment contracts.
3
These oral contracts commonly result in employer-employee
conflicts.4 In Illinois, employment-related breach of contract disputes
range from alleged oral promises for bonuses and commissions5 to
promises of job security.6 The Illinois Supreme Court faced this latter
1. Mary Ann Glendon & Edward R. Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment
Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. REV. 457, 483 (1979).
2. See Brent Appel & Gayla Harrison, Employment At Will in Iowa: A Journey
Forward, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 67, 69 (1989-90) (recognizing that handshakes often take
the place of written contracts); Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REV.
903, 903-05 (1985) (proposing that "any promise made in furtherance of an economic
activity is enforceable").
3. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 903.
4. See Frank Vickory, The Erosion of the Employment-at- Will Doctrine and the
Statute of Frauds: Time to Amend the Statute, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 97, 98-99 & n.3 (1992)
(advising management on how to avoid liability for alleged promises for permanent
employment).
5. See, e.g., Hartbarger v. SCA Serv. Inc., 558 N.E.2d 596, 599 (II. App. Ct. 1990);
Stein v. Maiden Mills, Inc., 292 N.E.2d 52, 54 (II!. App. Ct. 1972); Collins v. Addicks,
114 N.E.2d 801, 802 (II1. App. Ct. 1953).
6. See, e.g., Evans v. Gurnee Inns, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 556, 558 (II. App. Ct. 1994);
Kercher v. Forms Corp. of Am., Inc., 630 N.E.2d 978, 981 (III. App. Ct. 1994); Davies
v. Martel Lab. Serv., Inc., 545 N.E.2d 475, 476 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Wilder v. Butler
Mfg. Co., 533 N.E.2d 1129, 1130 (I11. App. Ct. 1989); Koch v. Ill. Power Co., 529
N.E.2d 281, 284 (II1. App. Ct. 1988); Ladesic v. Servomation Corp., 488 N.E.2d 1355,
1356 (Il. App. Ct. 1986); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 440 N.E.2d 998, 1001 (I11.
App. Ct. 1982) [hereinafter Martin I]; Gilliland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 388 N.E.2d 68, 69
(I1l. App. Ct. 1979); Heuvelman v. Triplett Elec. Instrument Co., 161 N.E.2d 875, 876
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type of conflict in Mclnerney v. Charter Golf, Inc.7 In Mclnerney, a
former employee sued his employer for breach of contract, alleging
that he had relinquished a lucrative job offer in exchange for his
employer's guarantee of a job "for the remainder of his life."8 The
Illinois Supreme Court decided in the employer's favor, holding that
although foregoing another job opportunity in exchange for an oral
promise of lifetime employment constituted sufficient consideration to
change an at-will employment relationship to a valid lifetime
employment contract, the statute of frauds barred the enforcement of
the promise because there was no writing.9
This Note first examines the validity of oral promises for
permanent' ° employment through an analysis of the contractual
requirements used to rebut the presumption of employment at will."
This Note next discusses how the exceptions to the statute of frauds1 2
and the doctrine of promissory estoppel"a can be used to enforce oral
promises for permanent employment. In doing so, this Note examines
the disagreement among the Illinois appellate courts concerning the
requirements for modifying at-will-employment,' 4 the applicability of
the exceptions to the statute of frauds' one-year clause, 15 and the
availability of the promissory estoppel doctrine.' 6 Next, this Note
discusses the facts of McInerney 7and the opinions of the majority' 8
and the dissent.' 9 This Note agrees with the majority's opinion that
foregoing another job opportunity is sufficient consideration to modify
an at-will employment contract.20 However, this Note criticizes the
majority for its inequitable and flawed decision that an oral promise for
(Ill. App. Ct. 1959).
7. 680 N.E.2d 1347 (Ill. 1997).
8. Id. at 1349.
9. See id. at 1353.
10. The terms "permanent" and "lifetime" will be used interchangeably throughout
this Note in order to maintain continuity with the language used by various judges and
authors. "Lifetime" employment contracts are essentially "permanent" employment
contracts. See id. at 1351-52. Throughout the McInerney decision, the court used
"permanent" and "lifetime" interchangeably. See id. at 1355.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See infra Part lI.A.3.b.
15. See infra Part II.B.1.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. See infra Part III.A.
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See infra Part III.C.
20. See infra Part IV.
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lifetime employment is barred by the statute of frauds, and argues that
the one-year exception, 21 the full performance doctrine, 22 or
promissory estoppel,' should excuse the absence of a writing.24 This
Note argues that the majority's rationale converts valid contracts for
lifetime employment into their original at-will employment status.
25
Finally, this Note predicts that the Mclnerney decision will ultimately
harm employees by denying a remedy to those who have detrimentally
relied upon an employer's verbal promise of permanent employment.26
II. BACKGROUND
Despite a presumption of at-will employment, oral statements
modify many employer-employee relationships into permanent
employment contracts.27 However, many of these oral contracts,
although valid, are not evidenced by a writing, and may therefore, be
barred by the statute of frauds.28 With regard to these oral
employment agreements, Illinois courts disagree as to whether
foregoing a job or job offer constitutes sufficient consideration for
these oral contracts,29 whether the possibility of death within one year
would complete performance of a lifetime employment contract, 30 and
whether an employee can state a cause of action based on the
promissory estoppel doctrine, despite the statute of frauds' writing
requirement.
31
A. Contractual Analysis of At-Will and Permanent Employment
Agreements
This section first discusses at-will employment contracts and
permanent employment contracts. This section next discusses the
judicially-created two-prong test used to determine the validity of
permanent employment contracts. This begins by outlining what is a
"clear and definite agreement," the first prong. Then, in great detail,
21. See infra Part IV.A.
22. See infra Part IV.B.
23. See infra Part IV.C.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part TV.
26. See infra Part V.
27. See infra notes 40-62 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 61-72 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 106-116 and accompanying text.
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this section discusses what constitutes "sufficient consideration" in
Illinois courts, the second prong.
1. The Presumption of At-Will Employment
Unless an employment contract specifies duration, Illinois law states
that the contract is presumed to be at-will. 32 At-will employment
provides that an employment agreement for an uncertain duration
allows the employer to terminate the employment relationship without
notice for any or no reason at all. 33 During the late nineteenth century,
the employment-at-will doctrine rose in popularity when the Industrial
Revolution necessitated a substantial increase in labor? 4 By the early
twentieth century, most jurisdictions adopted this doctrine.35
Even though the doctrine provides an employee with the
simultaneous right to leave employment without notice and for no
reason at all, the at-will rule favors employers while being unduly
harsh to employees. 36 Therefore, in the early 1970s, courts began to
limit an employer's right to terminate employees by creating legal
exceptions to the at-will doctrine.37 Today, a majority of courts
construe the doctrine as a simple rule of construction, treating at-will
employment as a rebuttable presumption.38 This presumption may be
32. See Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ill.
1987). A general or indefinite hiring is, on its face, employment-at-will. See Cortlan
H. Maddux, Employers Beware! The Emerging Use of Promissory Estoppel as an
Exception to Employment At Will, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 197, 201-02 (1997).
33. See Bowen v. United States Postal Service, 459 U.S. 212, 220 (1983); Kelsay v.
Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 360 (Ill. 1978); see also 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment
Relationship § 11 (1996) (recognizing that an agreement of open duration does not
adversely affect its legitimacy).
34. See Maddux, supra note 32, at 201-02. The at-will employment doctrine became
popular because of "its laissez-faire, free-market approach to employment contractual
relationships." Mark A. Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to Employment at-
Will-When Should Courts Defer to the Legislature?, 72 NEB. L. REV. 956, 960 (1993).
35. See Maddux, supra note 32, at 202 (citing Michael J. Phillips, Disclaimers of
Wrongful Discharge Liability: Time for a Crackdown?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1131, 1134
(1992)).
36. See Maddux, supra note 32, at 199. In most instances, the exercise of the
termination rights under employment-at-will harms the employee more than the
employer. See id. Usually the employee has fewer employment options, while the
employer has a vast number of potential employees waiting to pick up where the fired
employee left off. See id.
37. See Vickory, supra note 4, at 108-09. These exceptions are based on theories of
public policy, good faith and fair dealing, and termination standards specified in
employee handbooks. See id. at 118. For example, an employee who refuses "to engage
in illegal activities" for the employer is protected from retaliatory discharge. See Tom
Werner, The Common Law Employment-at-Will Doctrine: Current Exceptions for Iowa
Employees, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 291, 314 (1994).
38. See Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ill.
910 [Vol. 29
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rebutted and the at-will employment contract modified if the parties can
show that they "contracted otherwise." 39
2. Contracts for Permanent Employment
Lifetime or permanent employment contracts 4° assuage the
employee's fear of downsizing, while increasing employee loyalty to,
and productivity for, the employer .4  The main problem with oral
permanent employment contracts is their uncertain duration; thus, the
oral agreements may be unenforceable because they are presumed to
create at-will employment relationships absent a contrary indication.42
Three types of promises could be interpreted as guaranteeing
permanent employment: (1) promises that employees will be employed
for life, meaning until death, retirement, or disability; 43 (2) promises
1987).
39. Id. (finding that employee handbook stating termination reasons and procedures
rebutted at-will presumption); see also Johnson v. George J. Ball, Inc., 617 N.E.2d
1355, 1359-60 (II1. App. Ct. 1993) (providing that assurances of permanent
employment in exchange for moving family to another state might be sufficient to rebut
at-will presumption were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss); infra Part II.A.3.
(discussing the test used by courts to determine the validity of the oral contract).
40. See supra note 10. But see Milazzo v. O'Connell, 925 F. Supp. 1331, 1339 n.5
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (stating that under Illinois law, the phrase "permanent employment" is
"not limited to offers for lifetime employment"), aff'd 108 F.3d 129 (7th Cir.), reh 'g
denied, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 8562 (7th Cir. Apr. 22, 1997); Heuvelman v. Triplett
Elec. Instrument Co., 161 N.E.2d 875, 877 (II1. App. Ct. 1959) (finding that permanent
means that the employee could stay as long as the employer has work for the employee
and as long as the employee did his work satisfactorily).
41. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 925.
42. See 27 AM. JUR. 2D Employment Relationship § 34 (1996) (stating "permanent"
or "lifetime" employment is generally treated as terminable at-will for either party); see
also Dewachter v. Scott, 657 So. 2d 962, 962 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming
summary judgment against employee alleging oral contract for permanent employment,
holding such a contract terminable at-will).
43. See Molitor v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 N.E.2d 695, 698-99 (II1. App. Ct.
1945). The Molitor court held that the trial court erred in granting judgment not
withstanding the jury verdict to the employer. See id. at 699. The court found that
assurances by employer to employee that "'there is no reason why you couldn't have a
job here the rest of your life"' and that "'[y]ou can rely on [your job] being permanent"'
stated clear and definite terms of an enforceable contract. Id. at 697-98; see also Taylor
v. Canteen Corp., 69 F.3d 773, 782-83 (7th Cir. 1995). In Taylor, the employer told
the employee that he could have a job for "'as long as [the employee] wished,"' and
"'until he retired or decided he did not want the job anymore."' Id. The court held that
these statements, coupled with the statement, "'you have nothing to worry about,"'
constituted a sufficiently clear and definite promise of employment to preclude summary
judgment. Id. But see Lamaster v. Chicago & Northeast 111. Dist. Council of Carpenters
Apprentice & Trainee Program, 766 F. Supp. 1497, 1507-08 (N.D. II!. 1991) (stating
that permanent employment is different from a contract specified to last until the age of
sixty-five).
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that employees can stay as long as they desire;' and (3) promises not
to terminate absent unsatisfactory performance.45 These promises, if
supported by the required contractual elements,4 can be enforced as
valid contracts of permanent employment, thus rebutting the
presumption of an at-will agreement.47
3. Testing the Validity of an Oral Promise for Permanent
Employment
The traditional elements of a contract-offer, acceptance, and
consideration-are used to determine the validity of an oral promise
for permanent employment. 48 However, in the oral contracts "the
44. See Taylor, 69 F.3d at 782-83 (holding that alleged statements by employer to
employee promising job security for "as long as [employee] wished" were sufficiently
clear and definite to preclude summary judgment); see also Martin v. Federal Life Ins.
Co., 644 N.E.2d 42, 44 (III. App. Ct. 1994) [hereinafter Martin II]. In the Martin I1
case, the reviewing court held that statements by employer to employee that he could be
"rest assured that he would have continual employment" and that he "could have a job as
long as he wanted" were more than mere assurances-they were promises of a job with
continual employment for as long as the employee desired. Martin if, 644 N.E.2d at 44;
see also Strzelecki v. Schwarz Paper Co., 824 F. Supp. 821, 824 (N.D. Ill.. 1993). The
Strzelecki court held that plaintiff's allegations that he was asked to purchase and run
subdivision, and told that he could work at the company "for as long as he wanted, for at
least twenty more years," alleged clear and definite terms to withstand motion to
dismiss. Strzelecki, 824 F. Supp. at 828; see also Farr v. Continental White Cap, Inc.,
774 F. Supp. 522, 524 (N.D. II1. 1991) (holding that although the oral contract failed
for insufficient consideration, the words promising a job for as long as employee desired
were more than assurances of goodwill); Lamaster, 766 F. Supp. at 1503-04 (concluding
that plaintiff's allegations that employer promised him a director position for as long as
he chose to keep it were clear and definite terms sufficient to withstand motion to
dismiss).
45. See Wilder v. Butler Mfg. Co., 533 N.E.2d 1129, 1130 (II!. App. Ct. 1989)
(alleging that the employer's statement that the employee would have a job "as long as
[she] produced" was a permanent employment contract); Kula v. J.K. Schofield & Co.,
Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1126, 1133 (N.D. I11. 1987) (alleging that the employer's promise
that the employee had a job "as long as he continued to perform satisfactorily" created
permanent employment).
46. These contractual elements include: offer, acceptance, and consideration. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 22, 71 (1988). See also infra note 48 and
accompanying text (discussing how the traditional elements of a contract are used to
determine the validity of oral promises for permanent employment).
47. See supra Part II.A.3. (discussing how the traditional elements of contract are
examined to rebut the presumption of at-will employment).
48. See Tolmie v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 930 F.2d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 1991). One
party (the offeror) extends an offer, written or oral, that is accepted or rejected by the
other party (the offeree). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981)
(defining offer); id. § 50 (defining acceptance); id. § 38 (defining rejection). Once both
parties assent to the same terms and conditions at the same time, consideration will
make the contract enforceable. See id. § 22 (discussing mode of assent); id. § 71
(discussing the requirement of consideration).
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analysis is more scrutinizing. '" To overcome the presumption of, or
to modify at-will employment, the party seeking damages for a breach
of an oral contract must prove the contract's validity by showing: (1) a
clear and definite promise to employ for a particular duration, or to
terminate only upon a certain event or for specified reasons; and (2) the
giving of sufficient consideration.5
a. Clear and Definite Agreement for a Specific Duration
First, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether a clear and definite agreement for permanent
employment exists. 51 In particular, the courts must assess whether the
employer's conduct or representations reflect a guarantee of a
permanent job.52 Language between the employer and employee must
be clear and definite, and must not require the courts to impose an
obligation where none was intended or where the obligation is
ambiguous. 53  Furthermore, language that merely amounts to
'"optimistic expressions about the future" does not provide sufficient
consideration to establish an oral contract for permanent employment;
these types of statements express only "long continuing good will and
hope for eternal association."' However, the standard for creating a
49. Tolmie, 930 F.2d at 581 (noting that an offer with "clear and definite" terms is
required to support an oral employment contract, rather than any mere offer).
50. See Eastman v. Chicago, Cent. & Pac. R.R. Co., 930 F.2d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir.
1991); Lamaster v. Chicago & Northeast Ill. Dist. Council of Carpenters Apprentice &
Trainee Program, 766 F. Supp. 1497, 1499 (N.D. III. 1991); Kula, 668 F. Supp. at 1132-
33; Kercher v. Forms Corp. of Am., Inc., 630 N.E.2d 978, 981 (Ii. App. Ct. 1994);
Wilder, 533 N.E.2d 1129, 1130 (I11. App. Ct. 1989); Koch v. I11. Power Co., 529 N.E.2d
281, 284 (I11. App. Ct. 1988); Ladesic, 488 N.E.2d at 1356.
5 1. Courts consider factors such as the personnel policies or practices of the
employer, the employee's longevity of service, the communications by the employer to
assure continued employment, and the practices of the particular industry. See Pugh v.
See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925-26 (Cal. App. 1981). In one case, an
Illinois court focused on whether the promisor had the proper authority to guarantee job
security. See Martin 1I, 644 N.E.2d 42, 47 (I11. App. Ct. 1994) (finding that the
executive vice-president, who was also general counsel, had the authority to offer
lifetime employment).
5 2. See supra notes 38-39, 44-47.
53. See Koch, 529 N.E.2d at 284. In Koch, the plaintiff could not recall the language
used by the employer; thus, the contract failed for lack of clarity. See id. Further, some
"[clourts have held that where there are no definite terms of employment, ...
employment is and should be regarded as 'at-will."' Joseph Z. Fleming, Labor and
Employment Law: Recent Developments-At-Will Termination of Employment Has Not
Been Terminated, 20 NOVA L. REv. 437, 440 (1995) (discussing Florida courts).
54. Kercher, 630 N.E.2d at 981 (quoting Wilder, 533 N.E.2d at 1131) (holding that
comments by employer that plaintiff was being groomed to become president and that
job was a long-term proposition were not clear and definite terms); see also Wilder, 533
N.E.2d at 1130-31 (finding no clear and definite terms of an enforceable contract in the
19981 913
914 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 29
clear agreement is minimal; it merely requires that the alleged promise
be "clear enough that an employee would reasonably believe that an
offer has been made." 55 Determining the clarity of a promise requires
the use of an objective test, rather than a subjective one.' If no clear
promise for permanent employment exists, then the employment is
presumed to be at-will.57 If the promise is clear, the inquiry turns to
the sufficiency of the consideration.'
b. What Constitutes Sufficient Consideration
Consideration is a performance or a return promise that must be
bargained for, meaning that "it is sought by the promisor in exchange
for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that
promise., 59  Any promise, act, or forbearance that results in a
detriment to one party is consideration.'
statements by a manager to an employee that "You're the first woman here. There's no
problem. You have a permanent job."); Titchener v. Avery Coonley Sch., 350 N.E.2d
502, 506-07 (III. App. Ct. 1976) (holding that the statement by employer that "your
future is here at [defendant company] and I hope it will be for many years to come" did
not state clear and definite terms of an enforceable contract).
55. Tolmie v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 930 F.2d 579, 581 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing
Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ill. 1987)). But
see Razdan v. General Motors Corp., 979 F. Supp. 755, 760 (1977) (finding that the
employer's statement promising independent contractor a job "for as long as he wished"
was not clear and definite).
56. See Tolmie, 930 F.2d at 581. The analysis is objective because Illinois law
determines whether the alleged promise is "clear enough that an employee would
reasonably believe that an offer has been made." Id. However, courts require "objective
evidence of the employer's intent to never terminate him." Warren H. Albreeht, Jr., The
Changing Face of Employment Law and the Practical Lawyer, 67 N.D. L. Rev. 469, 473
(1991). In contrast, a subjective analysis would look at what the employee in question
believed to be true.
57. See Kercher, 630 N.E.2d at 981-82 (holding that the employment was terminable
at-will because the language did not establish a clear promise for permanent
employment).
58. See Kula v. J.K. Schofield & Co., Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1126, 1131 (N.D. I11. 1987).
Appellate court cases disagree as to what constitutes sufficient consideration and as to
whether additional consideration is necessary. See Lamaster v. Chicago & Northeast I11.
Dist. Council of Carpenters Apprentice & Trainee Program, 766 F. Supp. 1497, 1500
(N.D. III. 1991); see also infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text (discussing the
disagreements among the courts as to what constitutes sufficient consideration for a
permanent employment contract).
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFCONTRACTS § 71 (1981). Consideration insures that
the "promise enforced as a contract is not accidental, casual, or gratuitous," but has been
purposely given after deliberation or negotiation. MURPHY & SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN
CONTRACT LAW 28-29 (4th ed. 1991). For a contract to be enforceable, "neither 'serious
intent,' nor intention to be legally bound," is necessary for consideration. 2 JOSEPH M.
PERILLo & HELEN HADJIYANKKAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.3 (rev. ed. 1995).
60. See Davies v. Martel Lab. Serv., Inc., 545 N.E.2d 475, 477 (I11. App. Ct. 1989).
Detriment "means giving up something which immediately prior thereto the promisee
1998] McInerney v. Charter Golf, Inc. 915
Some Illinois courts find sufficient consideration where there is a
promise to forego another job or job offer on the express condition that
the current or new job will be permanent. 6' The key element is that
foregoing the alternative employment must be a "specially bargained-
for detriment., 62 Merely promising to do the job and "waiving the
right to pursue or accept alternative employment" will not support a
contract for permanent employment.' Rather, the exchange amounts
to consideration only where the plaintiff relinquishes a job or job offer
in exchange for a promise of permanent employment, and the
employer agrees to relinquish its right to fire that employee at will.'
was privileged to retain, or doing or refraining from doing something which he was then
privileged not to do, or not to refrain from doing." Id. (quoting I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 102A at 380-82 (3d ed. 1957)). Determining the exact circumstances that require the
application of the "legal detriment" principles is difficult. See Taylor v. Canteen Corp.,
69 F.3d 773, 784 (7th Cir. 1995). However, consideration probably exists when an
employee is "lured away from a position with a promise of permanent employment."
Taylor, 69 F.3d at 784; see also Adams v. Lockformer Co., 520 N.E.2d 1177, 1180 (II1.
App. Ct. 1988) (holding that employee's relinquishment of interest in a product
constituted sufficient consideration).
61. See Martin 1, 440 N.E.2d 998, 1003-04 (III. App. Ct. 1982). In Martin 1, the
plaintiff rejected a job offer, including a salary increase, improved benefits, and
increased opportunity for advancement, based upon the employer's promises that he
could "rest assured that he would have continual employment," and that he "could have a
job for as long as he wanted." Id. at 1001. The court found that the relinquishment of
this job offer for the alleged oral agreement for permanent employment was sufficient
consideration. See id. at 1003-04; see also Johnson v. George J. Ball, Inc., 617 N.E.2d
1355, 1359-60 (I11. App. Ct. 1993) (addressing the split among Illinois courts
regarding the need for "additional consideration" beyond relinquishing other job
opportunities); Molitor v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 N.E.2d 695, 698-699 (II1.
App. Ct. 1945) (finding plaintiff's giving up law practice in New York and moving to
Chicago per defendant's request as sufficient consideration).
Courts in other states agree with this position. See, e.g., Ohanian v. Avis Rent-A-Car
Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1985) (applying New York law and holding that
relocating from San Francisco to New York constitutes sufficient consideration to
establish an oral contract for lifetime employment); Eggers v. Armour & Co. of
Delaware, 129 F.2d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 1942) (holding that merely waiving the right to
pursue or accept alternative employment constitutes sufficient consideration); Shebar v.
Sanyo Bus. Sys. Corp., 544 A.2d 377 (N.J. 1988) (holding that employee's revocation
of his acceptance of another job opportunity was sufficient consideration); Kestenbaum
v. Pennzoil Co., 766 P.2d 280 (N.M. 1988) (holding that an implied contract requiring
good reason for termination was created by: (1) an employer's statement that
employment would be long-term and permanent, (2) a management practice not to
terminate except for good reason, and (3) no mention of the consequences of termination
without cause in an insurance benefits manual or in a policy manual).
62. Lamaster, 766 F. Supp. at 1502.
63. Milazzo v. O'Connell, 925 F. Supp. 1331, 1341 (N.D. I11. 1996) (quoting
Lamaster, 766. F. Supp. at 1501-02), aff'd 108 F.3d 129 (7th Cir.), reh'g denied, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 8562 (7th Cir. Apr. 22, 1997).
64. See Ladesic v. Servomation Corp., 488 N.E.2d 1355, 1357 (I11. App. Ct. 1986).
"Illinois courts will enforce an oral promise to employ a person for life or some other
916 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 29
Furthermore, if the requirement of consideration is met, the contract
does not require any "mutuality of obligation '' 65 or any additional
consideration. 66 Therefore, as long as the employment terms are
bargained-for, foregoing alternative employment sufficiently modifies
the former at-will employment contract.67
In contrast, some courts in Illinois vigorously argue that foregoing a
job or job offer is not sufficient consideration to enforce an oral
promise for lifetime employment. 68 Even if the terms of the oral
contract appear to be bargained for, these courts find that relinquishing
a job or job offer is simply incidental to accepting new employment.'
Although the new opportunity is more lucrative, the employee suffers
equally indefinite length of time only if the employee makes in return some sacrifice...
that he probably would not have made absent a guarantee of continued permanent
employment." Smith v. Board of Educ., 708 F.2d 258, 263 (7th Cir. 1983).
65. Martin 1, 440 N.E.2d at 1002-03 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
79 (1981)). But see Koch v. I11. Power Co., 529 N.E.2d 281, 285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(finding that the oral promise failed for lack of mutuality where the employee was free to
leave whenever he wanted and where the employer did not have the corresponding right
to dismiss the employee). "Mutuality of obligation" means that both parties have
similar obligations to each other. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79.
66. See Martin 1, 440 N.E.2d at 1003. If the intentions of the parties are
unambiguous, no additional consideration is necessary since the additional
consideration is merely used to assess the parties' intent. See id. The rule requiring
additional consideration, apart from service for wages, "is actually a rule of convenience
to be applied if the parties' intent regarding the permanent nature of employment is not
clear." Id.
67. See id. at 1002-03. The view that foregoing another offer satisfies the
consideration requirement is "more in line with the modern concepts of consideration."
Kula v. J.K. Schofield & Co., Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1126, 1131 (N.D. I11. 1987); see also
E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.11, at 66-67 (describing the "peppercorn" theory of
consideration). However, the Martin I court observed that "[n]ot every relinquishment
of a job or job offer will be sufficient consideration to support an alleged agreement of
permanent employment." Martin 1, 440 N.E.2d at 1004 n.l. Besides giving up a job or
job offer to accept a new one, there must be special circumstances, such as the giving up
of a more lucrative job offer, to change the at-will relationship to something more. See
id.
68. See Kercher v. Forms Corp. of Am., Inc., 630 N.E.2d 978, 981 (III. App. Ct.
1994); Koch v. Ill. Power Co., 529 N.E.2d 281, 285 (III. App. Ct. 1988); Ladesic, 488
N.E.2d at 1357; Heuvelman v. Triplett Elec. Instrument Co.,:161 N.E.2d 875, 878 (I11.
App. Ct. 1959). For example, the Heuvelman court found that there was no
consideration when an employee allegedly rejected an offer with- his employer's
competitor in reliance upon his employer's oral promise for permanent employment.
See Heuvelman, 161 N.E.2d at 878 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959).
69. See Ladesic, 488 N.E.2d at 1357-58. For instance, when a teacher left a tenured
teaching job and applied for a new position with a higher salary, the court held that there
was inadequate consideration and refused to find an oral contract for permanent
employment. See also Titchener v. Avery Cooney Sch., 350 N.E.2d 502, 507 (III. App.
Ct. 1976) (stating that there was no detriment to the plaintiff as consideration for the
promise).
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no detriment because he merely chose to accept job security over
money.7' The employee is "not surrendering anything of value" when
he promises to stay with or leave his current employer.7 Therefore,
these courts require that oral agreements for lifetime employment be
supported by additional consideration other than the foregoing of a job
or job offer.72
A few Illinois courts also contend that alleged oral promises for
lifetime employment are unenforceable because they lack mutuality of
promises. 73  Because the employee often does not make a return
promise to stay with the current employer for life, and is thus free to
leave at any time,74 these courts find these promises merely illusory.75
B. The Exceptions to the Statute of Frauds
An oral contract for lifetime employment requires a clear agreement
and the support of sufficient consideration. 6 However, even if these
two elements exist to establish a contract's validity, the statute of
70. See Ladesic, 488 N.E.2d at 1357. In Ladesic, the plaintiff rejected an offer with
increased benefits from a competing food catering company, and remained with his
current employer. See id. at 1356. Ladesic alleged that in exchange for rejecting the
competitor's offer, his current employer promised him permanent employment that
would end only if the plaintiff retired or gave four weeks' notice, or if the plaintiff was
performing unsatisfactorily. See id. The court ultimately found that sufficient
consideration did not exist. See id. Here, the employee "merely comparfed] the benefits
of one position with another," and chose job security over money. See id. at 1357.
The Ladesic court rejected the Martin I court's finding that additional consideration was
not required, noting that a substitution of the parties' intentions might lead to the
abolishment of the consideration requirement altogether. See id. at 1357.
71. Id. at 1357; see Heuvelman, 161 N.E.2d at 877.
72. See Smith v. Board of Ed., 708 F.2d 258, 263 (7th Cir. 1983); Bordenkircher v.
Burlington Air Express, No. 87 C 3897, 1989 WL 84998 (N.D. II1. July 19, 1985);
Heuvelman, 161 N.E.2d at 877. But see Martin 1, 440 N.E.2d at 1002 (criticizing the
Heuvelman rule as "overbroad" and "a misstatement of the consideration concept"). One
example of sufficient consideration is making some sacrifice, like moving a family. See
Smith, 708 F.2d at 263.
73. See Farr v. Continental White Cap, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 522, 525 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(holding that mutuality does not exist where employer cannot fire employee, but the
employee may leave whenever he wants); Koch, 529 N.E.2d at 285 (adopting Ladesic
over Martin 1); Ladesic, 488 N.E.2d at 1357 (holding that an employee suffers no
detriment in foregoing an alternative job opportunity-the employee is merely making a
choice).
74. See Ladesic, 488 N.E.2d at 1357.
75. See Payne v. AHFI/Netherlands, B.V., 522 F. Supp. 18, 22 (N.D. III. 1980);
Koch, 529 N.E.2d at 285; see also Annotation, Validity and Duration of Contract
Purporting to be for Permanent Employment, 60 A.L.R. 3d 226, 233 (1974 & Supp.
1990) (finding that courts generally hold that no mutuality exists without additional
consideration).
76. See Koch, 529 N.E.2d at 284; Martin 1, 440 N.E.2d at 1002-03.
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frauds' writing requirement may nonetheless bar the enforcement of an
oral promise.77 The Illinois statute of frauds requires a writing and a
signature by the promisor when the contract specifies that performance
is not to be completed within one year.78 The statute seeks to bar the
enforcement of contracts based solely upon fabricated oral evidence.79
The drafters feared that allegations of promises would go uncontested
if the alleged promisor, in this case the employer, died or forgot that
the oral promise was made.80
Despite the original intention of the drafters, some believe that the
statute of frauds may be used as a legal technicality to shield those who
breach contracts.8 This prompted the creation of the following
exceptions to excuse the writing requirement: (1) the one-year
exception; 82 (2) the full performance exception; 83 and (3) the part
performance doctrine."' Because of a prevailing distaste for the one-
year clause, many courts adopt and apply these exceptions in an effort
to significantly narrow the use of the statute.
77. See Milazzo v. O'Connell, 925 F. Supp. 1331, 1341 (N.D. II1. 1996), aff'd 108
F.3d 129 (7th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 8562 (7th Cir. Apr. 22,
1997); Lamaster v. Chicago & Northeast I11. Dist. Council of Carpenters Apprentice &
Trainee Program, 766 F. Supp. 1497, 1508-09 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Razdan v. General
Motors Corp., 979 F. Supp. 755, 760 (N.D. I11. 1977).
78. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 80/1 (West 1996). The statute of frauds provides in
pertinent part:
No action shall be brought, . . . upon any agreement that is not to be
performed within the space of one year from the making thereof, unless the
promise or agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some
memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be
charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.
Id.
79. See Vickory, supra note 4, at 98. The purpose behind the statute is to "promote
certainty in contracts by protecting against their enforcement on the basis of fabricated
verbal testimony." Id.
80. See id. at 101. Vickory argues that a writing is necessary when it is likely that an
employer will be unable to offer any testimony "due to death, retirement, or simply...
faded memories," making it "difficult for juries to separate fact from invention." Id. at
118.
81. See, e.g., id.
82. See infra Part II.B.1.
83. See infra Part II.B.2.
84. See infra Part II.B.2.
85. See Lamaster v. Chicago & Northeast I1l. Dist. Council of Carpenters Apprentice
& Trainee Program, 766 F. Supp. 1497, 1509 (N.D. Ii. 1991) (citing Goldstick v. ICM
Realty, 788 F.2d 456, 464 (7th Cir. 1986)); Hubbard v. Logsdon, 372 N.E.2d 101, 106
(I1. App. Ct. 1978). The Illinois Supreme Court has also interpreted the statute of frauds
narrowly. See Lee v. Central Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 308 N.E.2d 605 (III. 1974).
Mclnerney v. Charter Golf, Inc.
1. The Exception to the One-Year Clause
Illinois courts recognize an exception to the statute of frauds, and
will enforce an oral promise where the terms of the promise could
possibly be fully performed within one year of its making.86 The
statute of frauds language "not to be performed" is construed to mean
"not capable of being performed" within one year.87 Under this
interpretation, if the contracted performance is possible within one
year, the statute's writing requirement does not apply, even if it is
unlikely that performance will actually occur within the space of that
year.' Thus, in theory, a contract for lifetime employment may be
enforceable without a writing because the employee could die within
one year, thus fully performing her contractual obligations.
Illinois courts, however, disagree as to whether this exception
should exempt permanent employment contracts from the statute of
frauds' writing requirement.89 One line of cases concludes that the
possibility of an employee's death within one year renders the lifetime
employment contract fully performed. 9° These courts assert that the
applicability of the statute should depend on the nature of the
contingency, and whether the occurrence of the contingency would
"frustrate performance of the contract or complete the contract."9'
86. See Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 195 N.E.2d 250, 252 (Ill. App. Ct.
1964), affd, 202 N.E.2d 250 (1964) (holding that an oral contract is enforceable under
the statute of frauds only if performance within one year is possible); see also Evans v.
Fluor Dist. Cos., 799 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Goldstick, 788 F.2d at 464)
(stating that "if performance Iwithin one year] though unlikely is possible, that is
enough to take the agreement outside the grasp of the statute [of frauds]"). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 cmts. a & b (1981) (discussing the
possibility of performance within one year and discharge of the contract within one
year).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130 (1981).
88. See id. § 130, cmt. a (1981). The enforceability under the one-year exception
does not take into account the "actual course of subsequent events" or the "expectations
of the parties as to the probabilities." Id.
89. See Lamaster, 766 F. Supp. at 1507 (recognizing the disagreement among the
Illinois appellate courts over whether a contract for permanent employment is capable
of being performed within one year). Besides the split among Illinois courts, a split
among jurisdictions exists as to whether the statute of frauds bars the enforcement of
oral employment promises. See Jill L. Rosenberg, Trends in Wrongful Termination Law
and Common Law Tort Claims, in 23RD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW, at 695,
734-35 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-508, 1994).
90. See Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 202 N.E.2d 516, 518-19 (111. 1964);
Martin 1, 440 N.E.2d 998, 1005 (III. App. Ct. 1982); Gilliland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 388
N.E.2d 68, 70 (III. App. Ct. 1979); see also 2 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 446, at 549
(1950 & Supp. 1991) (reviewing situations where the continued life of a person was
necessary to enable performance).
91. Sinclair, 202 N.E.2d at 518-19; see Martin 1, 440 N.E.2d at 1005; Gilliland, 388
N.E.2d at 70; see also Evans v. Fluor Dist. Co., 799 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1986)
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These courts find that if the parties contracted the duration of the
employment contract to last for life, death would render the contract
fully performed.92 Likewise, death would prematurely terminate
permanent employment contracts contingent upon occurrences such as
retirement, good cause, or when the employee quits.93
In contrast, two Illinois appellate courts contend that death merely
cuts short the contract since parties anticipate a contract for permanent
or lifetime employment to last longer than a year.94 These courts
contend that parties to a permanent employment contract anticipate the
relationship to last longer than one year.95 Thus, these courts assert
that the possibility of death is irrelevant because it would frustrate the
expectations of the parties, as well as the actual subsequent events. 96
(agreeing that employee's possibility of death or resignation does not remove the oral
employment contract outside the statute of frauds); Milazzo v. O'Connell, 925 F. Supp.
1331, 1341 (N.D. I11. 1996) (discussing the different approaches taken by Illinois
courts), aff'd 108 F.3d 129 (7th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 8562
(7th Cir. Apr. 22, 1997); Drago v. Davis, No. 96 C 2398, 1996 WL 479696, * 4 (N.D.
III. Aug. 20, 1996) (interpreting Illinois law regarding oral promises for lifetime
employment); Farr v. Continental White Cap, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 522, 524 (N.D. Il1.
1991) (holding that risk of an employee's death within one year usually may not save an
otherwise unenforceable contract); Brudnicki v. General Elec. Co., 535 F. Supp. 84, 86-
87 (N.D. III. 1982). Death and termination are contingencies that "threaten the
longevity of any employment relationship." Brudnicki, 535 F. Supp. at 86-87.
"Whether the possibility of an employee's death or termination takes the employment
agreement from the bar of the Statute ... depends in large part on the underlying purpose
and specific terms of the agreement itself." Id. at 87 (citations omitted).
92. See supra note 91; see also CORBIN, supra note 90, § 446, at 549 (reviewing
situations where the continued life of a person was necessary to enable performance).
93. See Evans, 799 F.2d at 366 (contract to employ a 20-year old plaintiff until he
was 65 was not capable of being performed within one year); Farr, 774 F. Supp. at 524
(holding that the one-year exception applies to promises that an employee can stay as
long as he wants because the employee can leave in one year); Brudnicki, 535 F. Supp.
at 86-87 (contract for employment that "would extend over 24 years until plaintiff
retired at age 65" was void under the statute of frauds); Palmateer v. International
Harvestor Co., 406 N.E.2d 595, 597 (I11. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that the alleged
implied agreement to employ until retirement could not be completed in one year), aff'd
in part and rev'd in part, 421 N.E.2d 876 (II1. 1981); Gilliland, 388 N.E.2d at 70
(holding that death or bankruptcy would have simply terminated the employment
contract that was to last until the employee retired at the age of 62).
94. See Cohn v. Checkers Motors Corp., 599 N.E.2d 1112, 1116 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(agreeing that a contract expected "to last more than a year, such as a permanent
contract, should be in writing"); Koch v. Ill. Power Co., 529 N.E.2d 281, 286 (II1. App.
Ct. 1988) (stating that "a contract which should have a duration of more than one year,
such as a contract for permanent employment, should be in writing").
95. See Koch, 529 N.E.2d at 286; Cohn, 599 N.E.2d at 1116.
96. But see Hodge v. Evans Fin. Corp., 823 F.2d 559, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding
that death would effect full performance to a permanent employment contract, but not a
contract until retirement); Lamaster v. Chicago and Northeast I11. Dist. Council of
Carpenters, 766 F. Supp. 1497, 1508 (N.D. II1. 1991) (finding that death renders a
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Given this confusion, the Illinois courts no longer recognize the
assertion that death within one year by one party would render any
contract completely performed.97
2. Complete and Partial Performance
If the one-year exception does not apply, the writing requirement
may still be excused if there is complete or partial performance.
Generally, the statute of frauds requires a contract to be in writing if it
cannot be fully performed within one year. 98 However, where one
party completely or partially performs the terms of an oral contract,
this performance serves as strong evidence of the existence of the
contract, and may exempt the promise from the statute of frauds'
writing requirement. 99
Courts recognize that complete performance by one of the parties to
the alleged contract can bar the statute of frauds defense."° If the
employee's relinquishment of a job or job offer could render his
obligations fully performed, then the writing requirement is excused,
and the contract enforced.'0 '
lifetime or permanent employment contract fully performed); supra text accompanying
notes 81-84 (discussing the rationale and exceptions to the statute of frauds). "A
contract for 'permanent' employment is not within the one-year clause for the reason
that such a contract will be fully performed, according to its terms, upon the death of the
employee. The word 'permanent' has, in this connection, no more extended meaning
than 'for life."' CORBIN, supra note 90, § 466, at 549-50.
97. See Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 195 N.E.2d 250, 252-253 (holding that
termination and performance are not synonymous, thus, the possibility of death would
prematurely terminate a contract specified to last at least one year), affd 202 N.E.2d 516
(III. 1964). But see Stein v. Malden Mills, Inc., 292 N.E.2d 52, 57 (III. App. Ct. 1972)
(holding that the possibility of death rendered the sale contract for an unspecified
duration complete).
98. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1 (West 1996).
99. See Skinner v. Shirley of Hollywood, 723 F. Supp. 50, 53 (N.D. I11. 1989)
(citing Meyer v. Logue, 427 N.E.2d 1253, 1256 (II. App. Ct. 1989)).
100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 130, cmt. d (1981) (noting that the
one-year provision does not prevent enforcement of the promises of other parties if one
party completes performance); see, e.g., McIntosh v. Magna Sys., Inc., 539 F. Supp.
1185, 1190 (N.D. III. 1982) (discussing the statute of frauds); Sun Life Assur. Co. of
Canada v. Hoy, 174 F. Supp. 859, 864 (E.D. II1. 1959) (discussing generally the statute
of frauds under Illinois law); see also Adams v. Lockformer Co., 520 N.E.2d 1177, 1182
(I11. App. Ct. 1988) (finding that the employee's relinquishment of any rights in rival
concept constituted full performance of his obligations, thus barring the defense of the
statute of frauds); Mapes v. Kalva Crop., 386 N.E.2d 148, 152-53 (II. App. Ct. 1979)
(finding that the statute of frauds was barred where employee worked the entire year and
completed duties as required under oral employment contract). Illinois courts have long
held "[tihat executed, as opposed to executory, contracts are never voided." Mapes, 386
N.E.2d at 152-53 (citing Swanzey v. Moore, 22 I11. 63, 74 (II!. 1859)).
101. See American College of Surgeons v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 491 N.E.2d
1179, 1193 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). "[Wihen one party to a contract completes his
922 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 29
In addition, Illinois courts recognize and use the part performance
doctrine 2 to remove oral employment contracts from the statute of
frauds.0 3 When an employee partly performs contractual duties in
reliance on an employer's promise, the statute of frauds does not bar
enforcement of an oral agreement for a specified duration. 1°4 The
partial performance doctrine is limited, however, to situations where it
is impossible or impractical to compensate the performing party for his
work, and where refusal to enforce the promise would operate as a
fraud upon the party.0 5
performance, the one-year provision of the statute does not prevent enforcement of the
promises of the other party." Id.; see Lamaster, 766 F. Supp. at 1508 (noting that the
plaintiff turned down a substantial promotion to take a job with the defendant for as long
as he chose to do so); see also Balstad v. Solem Machine Co., 168 N.E.2d 732, 734 (II1.
App. Ct. 190) (addressing a dispute over the terms of an at-will contract).
For example, an Illinois appellate court found that an employee completed his part of
the bargained-for exchange with his employer when he gave up an interest to compete
with his employer for the employer's promise of three-years employment. See Adams,
520 N.E.2d at 1182. By focusing on the specific promise made by the employee, the
court found that the employee did not promise to work for the employer for three years,
rather, he promised to relinquish his interest in a rival product. See id.
102. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCoNTRAcrs § 130 cmt. e (1981).
103. See Tabora v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 664 N.E.2d 267, 276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)
(finding that the physician's reappointments did not constitute partial performance);
Johnson v. George J. Ball, Inc., 617 N.E.2d 1355, 1360 (III. App. Ct. 1993) (finding
that moving family to a new job location constituted partial performance); Davies v.
Martel Lab. Serv., Inc., 545 N.E.2d 475, 478 (I11. App. Ct. 1989) (stating that whether
the employee's acceptance of the terms and conditions of the offer "then and there,"
including commitment to pursue an MBA degree and serve as member of council,
amounted to partial performance was a question of fact); cf. Mapes, 386 N.E.2d at 152
(finding that since the employee had been paid for two months of work, partial
performance would not bar application of the statute of frauds).
104. Johnson, 617 N.E.2d at 1360; Culbertson v. Carruthers, 383 N.E.2d 618, 623
(I1l. App. 1978); see also Carmack v. Beltway Dev. Co., 701 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1985) (enforcing partially performed real estate commission agreement). For
example, an Illinois appellate court found that an employee's relocation in reliance on
his employer's promises was partial performance because it was one of the terms of the
bargained-for contract. See Johnson, 617 N.E.2d at 1360. But see Taylor v. Canteen
Corp., 789 F. Supp. 279, 284 (C.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 69 F.3d
773 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the doctrine of partial performance is inapplicable in
the employment context and that oral contracts for permanent employment must
completely comply with requirements of the statute of frauds).
105. See Mapes, 386 N.E.2d at 152 (citing Ellison v. Ellison, 23 N.E.2d 718 (II1.
1939)) (finding that since employee had been paid for two months of his work, there was
no partial performance). This doctrine focuses on whether a party has "suffered
substantial detriment without a remedy absent enforcement, and the other party would
reap an unearned benefit or windfall if permitted to plead the statute." In re Fairchild
Aircraft Corp. v. Whyte, 6 F.3d 1119, 1129 n.25 (5th Cir. 1993). See, e.g., Estate of
Kaiser v. Gifford, 692 S.W.2d 525, 526-27 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Carmack, 701 S.W.2d
at 40 (finding that loan from decedent was outside the statute of frauds despite oral
agreement to pay back over 300 monthly installments).
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C. The Use of Promissory Estoppel
When attempting to enforce an oral promise for permanent
employment, an employee may use promissory estoppel as .a defense
to the writing requirement of the statute of frauds. 0 6  Promissory
estoppel applies when an employer makes a promise to the employee
which the employer can reasonably expect to induce reliance on the
part of the employee, and when injustice can only be avoided by
enforcement of the promise. 7 Historically, courts used promissory
estoppel as a defensive theory to prevent a party from avoiding liability
for a promise.'0 8
Under Illinois law, a plaintiff asserting a breach of contract claim
under promissory estoppel must establish the following four elements:
(1) a clear and definite promise; (2) reliance upon that promise; (3)
reliance that is reasonably expected and foreseeable; and (4) a direct
injury resulting from the reliance." However, Illinois courts disagree
as to whether promissory estoppel claims can defeat the statute of
frauds' writing requirement.'' 0
106. See Maddux, supra note 32, at 198 (stating that employees may use promissory
estoppel to prevent an employer from asserting a statute of frauds defense based on the
absence of a writing).
107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 (1981). "It is clear that a
plaintiff may recover on a promissory estoppel theory despite the absence of a
contract." Genin, Trudeau & Co., Ltd. v. Integra Dev. Int'l, 845 F. Supp. 611, 616 (N.D.
I11. 1994) (citing Quake Constr. v. American Airlines, 565 N.E.2d 990, 1004 (111.
1990)).
108. See Maddux, supra note 32, at 198 (citing Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory
Estoppel: Principle from Precedents: Part 1, 50 MICH. L. REV. 639, 646-49 (1952)).
Note that some courts allow promissory estoppel to become an independent cause of
action, expanding the doctrine "beyond its traditional use as a defensive shield." Id. at
198; see also Joseph W. Ambush, Recent Developments in Employment-At-Will, in
EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL ON TRIAL 5, 19, 1987 A.B.A. SEC. LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW Div.
FOR PROF'L EDUC.
109. See Lamaster v. Chicago & Northeast I11. Dist. Council of Carpenters
Apprentice and Trainee Program, 766 F. Supp. 1497, 1505 (N.D. I11. 1991) (citing
Simmons v. John F. Kennedy Med. Ctr., 727 F. Supp. 440, 443 (N.D. II1. 1989)); see
also Quake Constr., Inc., v. American Airlines, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 990, 1004 (I11. 1990)
(concluding that defendants terminated construction contract on which construction
company had detrimentally relied).
110. See Time Warner Sports Merchandising v. Chicagoland Processing Corp., 974
F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (N.D. III. 1997) ("Illinois law has been unsettled as to whether
promissory estoppel claims are subject to the statute of frauds"); see also Phillips v.
Britton, 516 N.E.2d 692, 700 (I11. App. Ct. 1987) ("The law in Illinois is unsettled as to
whether an action based on promissory estoppel can prevail, where, as here, the action
would otherwise fall within the Statute of Frauds."). In addition, many federal courts
have attempted to predict how the Illinois Supreme Court would decide on the use of the
promissory estoppel doctrine as a bar to the statute of frauds. See, e.g., Genin, Trudeau
& Co., 845 F. Supp. at 619 (denying a motion to dismiss the promissory estoppel claim
based on the circumstances of the case); Novacor Chem. v. Aluf Plastics, Inc., No. 87 C
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Most Illinois courts dismiss promissory estoppel claims, finding
that such claims are barred by the statute of frauds' writing
requirement."' Although these courts refuse to allow parties to use
promissory estoppel to trump the statute of frauds, they do permit
parties to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel." 2 The doctrine of
equitable estoppel's use is limited to cases in which there is proof of
misrepresentation." 3 When considering oral employment contracts,
some Illinois courts adopt this rule, refusing to allow promissory
estoppel to defeat a statute of frauds defense." 4
In contrast, a long line of Illinois appellate court cases take the
opposite position and permit a cause of action predicated on the
9128, 1988 WL 135556, *3 (N.D. I11. Dec. 8, 1988) (asserting that the Illinois Supreme
Court would find the statute of frauds applicable to a promissory estoppel claim as the
law); Snellman v. A.B. Dick, No. 81 C 3048, 1987 WL 8619, *11 (N.D. I11. Mar. 24,
1987) (holding that the statute of frauds can defeat a promissory estoppel claim only in a
non-U.C.C. case); Michaels Corp. v. Trans World Metals, No. 87 C 3440, 1987 WL
14010, *2 (N.D. II1. July 14, 1987) (holding that promissory estoppel could be a
defense to the statute of frauds).
1 11. See Time Warner, 974 F. Supp. at 1172; see also infra notes 160-66.
112. See Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 202 N.E.2d 516, 518-19 (I11. 1964)
aff'g, 195 N.E.2d 250 (Iii. App. Ct. 1964); Ozier v. Haines, 103 N.E.2d 485, 488 (III.
1952); First Nat'l Bank v. McBride Chevrolet, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 138, 142 (Ill. App. Ct.
1994); Dickens v. Quincy College Corp., 615 N.E.2d 381, 385-86 (I11. App. Ct. 1993);
Cohn v. Checker Motors Corp., 599 N.E.2d 1112, 1117 (III. App. Ct. 1992). See also
infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
When the Illinois Supreme Court revisited the issue tangentially in Ceres Illinois, Inc.
v. Illinois Scrap Processing, Inc., it appeared to soften the Sinclair approach by stating
that the plaintiff need not show conduct that is "fraudulent in the strict legal sense."
Ceres Ill. Inc. v. Illinois Scrap Processing, Inc., 500 N.E.2d 1, 7 (II1. 1986) (quoting
Benyon Bldg. Corp. v. National Guardian Life Ins. Co., 455 N.E.2d 246, 252 (Iii. App.
Ct. 1983)); see also Genin, Trudeau & Co., 845 F. Supp. at 619 (citing Ceres, 500
N.E.2d at 7). Instead, the court stated that the test is "whether in all the circumstances of
the case, conscience and [the] duty of honest dealing should deny one the right to
repudiate the consequences of his representations or conduct." Ceres, 500 N.E.2d at 7
(quoting Benyon Bldg. Corp. v. National Guardian Life Ins. Co., 455 N.E.2d 246, 252
(Ill. App. Ct. 1983)); see also Genin, Trudeau & Co., 845 F. Supp. at 618-19.
113. See Sinclair, 202 N.E.2d at 518. The doctrine of equitable estoppel requires that
a party allege words or conduct amounting to a misrepresentation or concealment of
material facts. See id. Individuals who relied on an employer's representations use
equitable estoppel to prevent the promisor from denying or lying about the promise.
See Maddux, supra note 32, at 205-06. However, the requirement of misrepresentation
has limited the use of equitable estoppel and makes it impractical. See id. As a result,
promissory estoppel was created to protect this reliance. See id.
114. See First Nat'l Bank, 642 N.E.2d at 142 (finding that bank did not have to
honor oral agreement with customer); Vajda v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 624 N.E.2d
1343, 1350-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (finding promissory estoppel applicable because
there were sufficient writings to remove an employment contract from statute of frauds);
Dickens, 615 N.E.2d at 386 (stating that two-year coaching contract had to be in
writing); Cohn, 599 N.E.2d at 1116 (stating that contract for resale of taxi cab business,
in which performance could not be within a year, had to be in writing).
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doctrine of promissory estoppel despite the absence of a writing.,"5
These courts allow parties to allege promissory estoppel so long as
they demonstrate some kind of reasonable reliance on the alleged oral
promise."'
III. DISCUSSION
A. Facts of the Case and the Lower Courts' Opinions
In Mclnerney v. Charter Golf, Inc., 7 Dennis Mclnerney sued his
former employer, Charter Golf, for breach of contract when Charter
Golf fired him." 8 Mclnerney worked as a sales representative for
Charter Golf from 1988 through 1992." 9 In 1989, another
manufacturer and seller of golf apparel offered Mclnerney a position as
an exclusive sales representative, with an eight percent commission. 2 '
Mclnemey planned to accept the competitor's offer, but during his
attempt to tender his resignation, Charter Golf's president, Jerry
Montiel, made an oral counter-offer.'12  If Mclnerney rejected the
competitor's offer and continued to work for Charter Golf, Montiel
promised Mclnerney a ten percent commission on sales "for the
115. See Leekha v. Wentcher, 586 N.E.2d 557, 563 (I1. App. Ct. 1991) (recognizing
promissory estoppel as a separate cause of action despite an absence of a writing); Derby
Meadows Util. Co. v. Inter-Continental Real Estate, 559 N.E.2d 986, 995 (I11. App. Ct.
1990) (holding that real estate company's statement regarding use of utility company
gave rise to claim of promissory estoppel by utility company); Gold v. Dubish, 549
N.E.2d 660, 664 (II. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that prospective buyers could raise
promissory estoppel claim for relied-upon oral promise); see also Colosi v. Electri-Flex
Co., 965 F.2d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that a discharged employee could have
argued promissory estoppel if the employee had reasonably relied on the company's
promise to continue to pay); Lamaster v. Chicago & Northeast I11. Dist. Council of
Carpenters Apprentice and Trainee Program, 766 F. Supp. 1497, 1505 (N.D. II!. 1991)
(allowing promissory estoppel doctrine to proceed because the defendant failed to raise
the argument that promissory estoppel undermines the presumption of employment at
will).
1 16. See Gold, 549 N.E.2d at 664. For example, in Gold, prospective buyers claimed
that they quit their jobs in reasonable reliance upon a property owner's promise that the
transaction would be completed by a specific date. See id. at 664. The court held that the
buyers adequately alleged promissory estoppel despite the absence of a writing. See id.
The court also noted that there was no practical difference between promissory estoppel
and equitable estoppel. See id.
117. 680 N.E.2d 1347 (Iii. 1997).
118. See id. at 1349.
119. See id.
120. See id. The decision does not state what commission Mclnerney was making at
the time of the eight percent commission offer. See id.
121. See id.
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remainder of his life."' " Mclnerney accepted this offer, placing him
in a favorable position because the company could now only discharge
him for two reasons: dishonesty or disability. 2
However, three years after the promise for lifetime employment,
Mclnerney was discharged.' 24 Mclnerney then filed suit against
Charter Golf for breach of contract.'" 5 The circuit court granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment 26 and the appellate court
affirmed on a completely different ground. 27 The plaintiff then
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court."2
B. Majority Opinion
On May 22, 1997, in a four-to-three decision, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that, although foregoing the other job offer was sufficient
consideration to modify an existing at-will employment relationship,
the statute of frauds barred the enforcement of the oral promise for
lifetime employment between Mclnerney and Charter Golf.129 This
decision resolved the conflict among the Illinois lower courts as to
what constitutes sufficient consideration to modify a contract, whether
a lifetime or permanent employment contract falls into the one-year
exception to the statute of frauds, and whether promissory estoppel is
applicable, notwithstanding the statute of frauds. 30
1. Foregoing Another Job Opportunity for Permanent Employment Is
Bargained-for Consideration
In Mclnerney, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a contract is
formed when an employee promises to forgo another employment
122. Id.
123. See id. Pursuant to Charter Golf's offer, Mclnerney would be employed in a
position where he could only be fired for dishonesty or disability. See id.
124. See id. The court noted that the reason for discharge was because of the souring
of the relationship between the company and Mclnerney. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. The trial court concluded that "the alleged oral contract was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds because the contract amounted to an agreement
which could not be performed within a year from its making." Id.
127. See id. This appellate court decision, No. 1-94-1764, is an unpublished order
under Supreme Court Rule 23. "The appellate court held that the putative contract
between Mclnemey and Charter Golf suffered from a more fundamental flaw, namely, that
no contract for lifetime employment even existed because a promise to forbear another
job opportunity was insufficient consideration to convert an existing employment-at-
will relationship into a contract for lifetime employment." Id.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 1353. Justice Heiple, joined by Justices Freeman, Bilanic and
Harrison, wrote the opinion for the majority. See id. at 1348-53.
130. See id. at 1349-50, 1351-52; supra Part II.
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opportunity in exchange for an employer's return promise of
permanent employment. 3 ' In this case, the court found a bargained-
for exchange between Mclnerney and Charter Golf, evidencing a
modification of the at-will employment agreement into a lifetime
employment contract.132
The court found that Montiel, Charter Golf's president, engaged
Mclnerney in negotiations over the terms of Mclnerney's contract at
Charter Golf. 133 The parties then came to an agreement in which
Charter Golf retained a valuable employee and Mclnerney, in return,
received job security.' 34 Thus, the at-will employment relationship
changed to lifetime employment when Charter Golf promised to
relinquish its right to terminate Mclnerney for any reason, other than
disability and dishonesty, without notice, and Mclnerney promised to
forgo a valuable job offer. 35  In analyzing the definition of
consideration, the court concluded that both parties exchanged
"bargained-for benefits."'' 36  The court rejected the defendant's
assertions that additional consideration was necessary.' 37 The court
also rejected the defendant's assertion that the lack of mutuality of
obligation barred enforcement of the promise.'38 Rather, the court
found that mutuality of obligation was not required, given that there
was other consideration for the contract at issue. 131
131. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1351. Although the first element of proving a
clear and definite promise was not at issue, the court acknowledged this test and implied
that it was met. See id. at 1349.
132. See id. at 1351; supra Part II.A (discussing rebuttal and modification of at-will
employment).
133. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1350-51.
134. See id. at 1351.
135. See id.
136. Id. at 1350. Consideration is a "bargained-for exchange of promises or
performances, and may consist of a promise, an act or a forbearance." Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1981)). Thus, Mclnerney's promise, in
exchange for Charter Golf's promise, was sufficient consideration. See id. The court
stated that holding otherwise "would ignore the economic realities underlying the case."
Id.
137. See id. The court noted that the defendant failed to give "any principled reason
why this court should depart from traditional notions of contract law," and stated that "a
promise for promise constitutes consideration to support the existence of a contract."
Id. at 1350.
138. See id. at 1351. The defendant argued that because Mclnerney could quit at any
time, whereas Charter Golf had no corresponding right to terminate, there was no
mutuality of obligation, thus rendering the contract unenforceable. See id.
139. See id. at 1350-51. "If the requirement of consideration is met, there is no
additional requirement of . . .mutuality of obligation." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 79 (1981); see also Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can
Co., 133 N.E. 711, 714 (I11. 1922) (holding that mutuality of obligation is not essential
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In addition, the court noted the split between the appellate courts as
to whether foregoing another job or job offer in exchange for
permanent employment is sufficient consideration."' The-court
ultimately agreed with the Martin I court which stated that a valid
lifetime employment contract forms when an employee gives up
another job opportunity in direct exchange for job security.14'
However, the court recognized that "not every relinquishment of a job
offer will necessarily constitute consideration to support a contract."' 42
2. Possibility of Death in First Year of Lifetime Employment Does
Not Excuse Writing Requirement of Statute of Frauds
Although the court found a valid contract in Mclnerney's case, the
court refused to enforce the alleged oral promise because it fell within
the statute of frauds' one-year provision, and was not evidenced by a
writing.' 43 The court observed that many courts construe the phrase
"not to be performed" to mean "not capable of being performed"
within one year.'" Under this interpretation, an oral contract for
lifetime employment could be enforced because the employee could die
within one year, thus completing the contract. 45
The Mclnerney court rejected this interpretation to the extent that it
allowed the possibility of death within one year to excuse the lack of a
written contract. 46  The court found that the "actual course of
where there is other consideration).
140. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1349-50. The court stated that "[alithough the
rules of contract law are well-established and straightforward, a conflict has emerged in
the appellate court decisions on the subject of consideration in the context of a lifetime
employment contract." Id. at 1349.
141. See id. at 1350. "When, as here, the employee relinquishes something of value
in a bargained-for exchange for the employer's guarantee of permanent employment, a
contract is formed." Id. at 1351. "Here Mclnerney gave up a lucrative job offer in
exchange for a guarantee for lifetime employment; and in exchange for giving up its
right to terminate Mclnerney at will, Charter Golf retained a valued employee." Id. at
1350.
142. Id. Although the court did not articulate exactly what consideration would be
insufficient, it did emphasize the necessity of a bargained-for exchange. See id.
"Clearly both parties exchanged bargained-for benefits in what appears to be a near
textbook illustration of consideration." Id.
143. See id. at 1352-53.
144. See id. at 1351. These courts look to see if performance within one year is
possible according to the contract's terms; and, if it is, the contract will not be found to
be within the statute of frauds, regardless of how unlikely it is that it will actually be
performed within one year. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. This
interpretation signifies an effort to narrow the application of the statute and to broaden
the one-year exception. See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
145. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1351.
146. See id. at 1351 n.l. The court called the interpretation "hollow" and
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subsequent events" and "expectations of the parties" were crucial
factors.'47 The court reasoned that because a lifetime employment
contract is a permanent contract, the employer would anticipate a
relationship of longer than one year.t48 In addition, the court
rationalized that the purpose of the statute of frauds was to bar
frivolous claims based upon loose oral statements, 49 and to protect
against "charlatans, perjurers and the problems of proof' associated
with oral contracts. 50  Ultimately, the majority concluded that
enforcing an oral lifetime employment contract would frustrate the
purpose behind the statute of frauds, thereby inviting fraud and
confusion.' 5 '
Additionally, the court observed the distinction between "death as
full performance and death operating to terminate or excuse the
contract."' 52 However, because the complete performance intended by
McInerney and Charter Golf, is lifetime employment, which is the
same event giving rise to termination or excuse, the court considered
this distinction useless.' 3
3. The Part and Complete Performance Exceptions Do Not Apply
The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected McInerney's assertions that
the oral contract should be enforced because McInerney performed,
either fully or partially, the terms of his oral contract.' The court
recognized that full performance of the contract by merely one party
would mandate enforcement of the oral contract. 55 However, the
"unpersuasive." Id. at 1351.
147. Id. at 1351.
148. See id. at 1351-52.
149. Id. at 1351.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 1352. The court stated that oral lifetime employment contracts would
"eviscerate the policy underlying the statute of frauds." See id.
152. Id. at 1351, n. 1 (citing Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 195 N.E.2d 250 (III.
App. Ct. 1964), aff'd 202 N.E.2d 516 (II1. 1964); Martin 1, 440 N.E.2d 998, Gilliland v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 388 N.E.2d 68 (II1. App. Ct. 1979)). Contrary to views that treat
death as full performance of the contract, some courts treat the possibility of death
within a year as a contingency that would prematurely terminate the contract. See id.;
see also supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the one-year provision and Illinois judicial
interpretations of its meaning).
153. See id. This distinction would determine that Mclnerney's death within one year
of the contract's creation would have rendered the contract fully performed. See id.
154. See id. at 1352; see also supra Part I.B.2 (discussing in detail the part
performance doctrine).
155. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1352 (citing American College of Surgeons v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 491 N.E.2d 1179 (II1. App. Ct. 1986)). This exception
"exists to avoid a 'virtual fraud' from being perpetrated on the performing party." Id.
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court reasoned that Mclnerney's full performance was impossible
because the terms of the contract required him to work until his death,
and he remains alive. s
Next, the court asserted that the part performance doctrine did not
apply because Mclnerney had been fully compensated for his work.'5
According to the court, partial performance only bars the use of the
statute of frauds when it is otherwise impossible to compensate the
performing party."
4. Promissory Estoppel Does Not Bar the Application of the Statute
of Frauds
The court rejected Mclnerney's contention that the defendant should
be estopped from asserting the writing requirement of the statute of
frauds to bar enforcement of the oral promise pursuant to any estoppel
doctrines.159 First, the court determined that equitable estoppel did not
apply because Mclnerney's complaint lacked allegations of coercion,
misrepresentation, or fraud.1" Second, the court held that reasonable
reliance on an employer's promise was insufficient to allow
promissory estoppel to bar the application of the statute of frauds.'
61
Rather, promissory estoppel would apply only if Mclnerney could
demonstrate a lack of alternative remedies, coupled with the existence
of "some element of unjust enrichment."'' 62  Because Mclnerney
received compensation for his work, the only injustice he suffered was
his employer's failure to provide him with lifetime employment. 163
Consequentially, this failed to illustrate injury under the meaning of
(quoting Barrett v. Geisinger, 35 N.E. 354, 357 (I1l. 1893)).
156. See id.
157. See id. "Accordingly, part performance-on these facts-will not take the case
out of the statute of frauds." Id.
158. See id. The court noted that partial performance bars the use of the statute of
frauds only if "it would otherwise be 'impossible or impractical to place the parties in
status quo or restore or compensate' the performing party for the value of his
performance." Id. (quoting Mapes v. Kalva Corp., 386 N.E.2d 148 (I1. App. Ct. 1979)).
159. See id. McInerney argued that he relied upon the oral promise of Charter Golf to
his detriment and that injustice would arise without enforcement of the promise. See id.
160. See id. at 1352-53. "Equitable estoppel is available if one party has relied upon
another party's misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact." Id. at 1352 (citing
Sinclair v. Sullivan Chevrolet Co., 202 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ill. 1964); Ozier v. Haines,
103 N.E.2d 485, 487-88 (Ill. 1952)).
161. See id. at 1352.
162. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139 cmt. c, at 355-56
(1981)).
163. See id. at 1352-53. The court reasoned that Mclnerney had already been
compensated for his work, such that the "sole injustice" about which he complain[ed
was] his employer's failure to honor its promise of lifetime employment." Id. at 1353.
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promissory estoppel.' 64 Further, the court chastised the plaintiff for
his claim because he was a "sophisticated man of commerce," who
should have known not to rely on the promise.165 Thus, the court
concluded that it would adhere to Illinois Supreme Court precedent
providing that the statute of frauds is applicable even where a party has
relied on a promise.16
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Nickels, joined by Justice Miller and Justice McMorrow,
authored the dissent.67 Agreeing with the majority, the dissent noted
that relinquishment of an alternative job offer constitutes sufficient
consideration for the promise of lifetime employment.' 6s However,
the dissent strongly disagreed with the majority's conclusion that a
lifetime employment contract required a writing in order to be
enforceable.' 69 The dissent asserted that the majority's holding: (1)
contradicts the statutory language and substantial precedent; (2) lacks
any policy justifications; and (3) increases uncertainty with regard to
the one-year provision.' 70
1. Contradicts Statutory Language
According to the dissent, the majority lacked persuasive justification
for its broad construction of the statute of frauds.17 ' The dissent noted
that the prevailing view among the judiciary and other authorities
illustrates that when performance is contingent upon the duration of
human life, the promise is not barred by the statute of frauds.' 72 The
164. See id. at 1352-53.
165. Id. at 1353.
166. See id.
167. See id. (Nickels, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 1353 (Nickels, J., dissenting) (stating the "plaintiff's promise to
forgo another job opportunity is sufficient consideration ...").
169. See id. (Nickels, J., dissenting). Hence, the dissent argued that the contract did
not fall within the requirements of the statute of frauds. See id. (Nickels, J., dissenting).
170. See id. at 1355 (Nickels, J., dissenting).
171. See id. at 1353-54 (Nickels, J., dissenting).
172. See id. at 1353 (Nickels, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACrs § 130, illus. 2, at 328 (1981)); 72 AM. JUR. 2D Statute of Frauds § 14, at 578
(1974)). "The rule generally accepted by the authorities is that an agreement or promise
the performance or duration of which is contingent on the duration of human life is not
within the statute ...." 72 AM. JUR. 2D Statute of Frauds § 14, at 578 (1974); see also
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 19-20, at 810 (3d ed. 1987)
(discussing the promise of extended performances and the happening of a condition and
stating that "if A promises ...to employ X for life, the promise is not within the
Statute because it is not for a fixed term and the contract by its terms is conditioned upon
the continued life of x and the condition may cease to exist within a year because X may
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possibility of death within one year, even if slight, would render the
contract fully performed, thus taking the contract outside the statute. 73
Furthermore, the dissent asserted that this prevailing interpretation is
evident by the plain language of the statute. 174 The unambiguous
terms of the one-year provision require that, in order to fall within the
one-year provision, "the agreement must be one of which it can truly
be said at the very moment that it is made, 'This agreement is not to be
performed within one year.'""75 Further, the dissent noted that even if
consideration of the statute's purpose was proper, the majority still
lacked justification for extending the statute such broad meaning.' 76
Consequently, according to the dissent, Charter Golf's promise to
employ Mclnerney until death failed to fall within the one-year
provision because Mclnerney's death within one year would render the
contract fully performed.'77
2. Lack of Justification
The dissent stressed a narrow construction of the one-year provision
of the statute of frauds,' 78 finding such construction reasonable due to
a lack of identifiable rationale for the provision. 79  Specifically,
although the purpose of the statute of frauds is to protect parties from
forgetting their obligations under prior promises, the one-year
die within a year").
173. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1354 (Nickels, J., dissenting) (citing CORBIN,
supra note 90, § 444, at 535). The issue "is not what the probable, or expected, or actual
performance of the contract was; but whether the contract, according to the reasonable
interpretation of its terms, required that it should not be performed within the year." Id.
at 1354 (Nickels, J., dissenting) (quoting Warner v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 164 U.S.
418, 434 (I11. 1896)). Caselaw demonstrates that there "must not be the slightest
possibility that it can be fully performed within one year." Id. (quoting CORBIN, supra
note 90, § 444, at 535). Thus, the dissent concluded that the majority incorrectly
considered whether the parties expected that the contract would take more than one year
to perform. See id. at 1353 (Nickels, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 1354 (Nickels, J., dissenting). In fact, the dissent explained, "lilt is
well established that Where the words of a statutory provision are unambiguous, there is
no need to resort to external aids of interpretation in order to glean the legislative's
purpose." Id. (Nickels, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 1354 (Nickels, J., dissenting) (quoting CORBIN, supra note 90, § 444, at
535). Because of the unambiguous words of the one-year provision in this case, the
dissent considered its narrow and literal interpretations proper. See id. (Nickels, J.,
dissenting). ,
176. See id. (Nickels, J., dissenting) (providing that the majority "lack[ed] any
reasoned basis for its holding ... resort[ing] to nearly tautological wordplay ...
177. See id. (Nickels, J., dissenting).
178. See id. (Nickels J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 1353 (Nickels, J., dissenting).
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provision does not adequately guard against these dangers" because
there is "no necessary relationship between the time of the making of
the contract, the time within which its performance is required and the
time when it might come to court to be proven."' 8'
Furthermore, the dissent criticized the majority for its belief that a
"lifetime" employment contract implies a long-term relationship.'82
While the dissent agreed that a lifetime employment contract is
essentially a permanent employment contract, the dissent asserted that
the mere label of "permanent" should not bar its enforcement.1
83
3. Increased Uncertainty
Unlike the majority's assertion that barring enforcement of oral
lifetime employment contracts was necessary to avoid confusion and
uncertainty, the dissent argued that this ban would only create greater
uncertainty.' 84 The dissent asserted that additional confusion would
result from the lack of articulable standards designating which types of
contracts include relationships that are greater than one year. 85 As a
result of this failure, the dissent foresaw a future of guessing games to
determine whether the statute of frauds' one-year provision bars
enforcement of their contract for an uncertain duration.' 86 In
conclusion, the dissent stated that it would reverse the judgments of
180. See id. (Nickels J., dissenting) (stating that the majority "notes the dangers of
stale evidence and faded memories").
181. Id. (Nickels, J., dissenting) (quoting CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 172, §
19-17, at 807 (quoting D & N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 992,
993 (N.Y. 1984))). The problem with the one-year provision is that if the suit is
brought a few years after the alleged breach, the memories will be stale and the one-year
provision is ineffective. See infra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
182. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1355 (Nickels, J., dissenting). The dissent
argued that the majority failed to support the idea that a "lifetime" employment contract
"inherently anticipates a relationship of long duration." Id. (Nickels, J., dissenting).
183. See id. (Nickels, J., dissenting) (quoting CORBIN, supra note 90, § 446, at 549-
50). "'A contract for permanent employment is not within the one-year clause for the
reason that such a contract will be fully performed, according to its terms, upon the death
of the employee. The word permanent has, in this connection, no more extended
meaning than for life."' Id. (Nickels, J., dissenting) (quotation mark omitted) (quoting
CORBIN, supra note 90, § 446, at 549-50).
184. See id. (Nickels, J., dissenting) (stating that the "majority's reasoning is likely
to cause greater confusion and uncertainty").
185. See id. (Nickels, J., dissenting). The dissent criticizes the majority for
declaring that lifetime employment contracts "anticipate" a relationship of more than
one year without providing "guidance as to other types of contracts that do not ... set
forth a specific time frame for performance." Id.
186. See id. (Nickels, J., dissenting). The parties to the contract would no longer be
able to look at the actual terms of their agreement to determine whether the contract
needed to be in writing. See id. (Nickels, J., dissenting).
934 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 29
the lower courts and find Charter Golf's promise for lifetime
employment enforceable even absent a writing.8 7
IV. ANALYSIS
Mclnerney v. Charter Golf, Inc. attempted to resolve three
controversial issues in Illinois contract and employment law: (1)
whether foregoing a job opportunity is sufficient consideration of a
lifetime employment contract; (2) whether oral promises for such a
contract require a writing; and (3) whether promissory estoppel can be
applied notwithstanding the statute of frauds."m While the Illinois
Supreme Court correctly concluded that foregoing another job offer or
job created sufficient consideration to modify the at-will employment
relationship, 8 9 the Court erroneously barred its enforcement pursuant
to the statute of frauds' writing requirement.' 90 In doing so, the Court
ignored the existence of both judicially-created exceptions and the
doctrine of promissory estoppel.19' The Court improperly reverted a
valid permanent employment contract into an at-will employment
relationship."' z
The Court's rationale for finding the promise within the one-year
clause, and refusing to apply any of the statute's exceptions lacks both
logical support and persuasiveness.' 93 The dissent highlighted these
187. See id. (Nickels, J., dissenting).
188. See supra Part III.A for an explanation of the confusion among Illinois courts
about: (1) whether foregoing a job or job offer constitutes sufficient consideration to
rebut the at-will presumption; (2) whether oral promises for permanent employment
require a writing; and (3) whether promissory estoppel can be applied notwithstanding
the statute of frauds. See also Taylor v. Canteen Corp., 69 F.3d 773, 783 (7th Cir.
1995) (noting that "[aIdditional guidance [on whether relinquishing present
employment or another job offer constitutes adequate consideration] from the Illinois
Supreme Court is sorely needed"); Lamaster v. Chicago & Northeast Ill. Dist. Council of
Carpenters Apprentice & Trainee Program, 766 F. Supp. 1497, 1507 (N.D. I11. 1991)
(noting the Illinois Supreme Court's silence concerning whether the statute of frauds
bars an oral promise for permanent or lifetime employment).
189. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1353 (Nickels, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the
majority's conclusion on the consideration issue).
190. See id.; infra Part IV.A-C (discussing death as complete performance of the
contract, the court's failure to recognize this doctrine, and the unresolved issue of
promissory estoppel in this area of law).
191. See infra Part IV.A-C.
192. But see Vickory, supra note 4, at 111-12 (noting that "[tihe presumption that
'lifetime' or 'permanent' employment contracts are employment-at-will contracts
shields employers from the undesirable effects of the statute of frauds 'one year' rule
allowing such long-term contracts to be enforced without a writing").
193. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1355 (Nickels, J., dissenting) (noting that the
court lacked any reasoned basis for its holding and lacked a persuasive justification for
its broad construction of the statute).
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weaknesses and provided sound reasons for supporting a narrow
construction of the statute of frauds. 94  However, the dissent's
discussion contains flaws as a result of its failure to discuss the
complete performance doctrine, and to examine the majority's faulty
determination that the statute of frauds barred the use of promissory
estoppel. 9 5 Rather, the Mclnerney court should have enforced the
oral promise based on the one-year exception, the full performance
exception, and/or the doctrine of promissory estoppel.' 96 Enforcing
the valid permanent employment agreement would have created an
equitable precedent, supported by solid legal reasoning/97
A. Death Would Legitimately Complete Performance
While recognizing that an employee's death within one year would
have rendered a lifetime employment contract completely performed,"9
the majority in Mclnerney nonetheless erroneously rejected this well-
supported conclusion,'" calling it "hollow and unpersuasive."2 °° The
court's broad interpretation of the statute of frauds conflicts with well-
supported precedent. 20 ' First, the United States Supreme Court, in
analyzing the one-year exception to the statute of frauds, noted the
irrelevant impact of both the parties' expectations and subsequent
events to determine whether performance of a contract can be
completed within one year of its making. 212  Specifically, the
194. See supra Part III.C (discussing the Mclnerney dissent's criticism of the
majority's opinion); infra Part IV.A-B (discussing why the promise was possible within
one year and why complete performance existed).
195. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1353 (Nickels, J., dissenting).
196. See Evans v. Fluor Dist. Co., Inc., 799 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1986)
(discussing the applicability of the statute of frauds to a promise the existence of which
has been admitted by the employer); Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 905 (noting
that promissory estoppel and other exceptions should enforce credible promises because
"the underlying legal policy is to protect the ability of individuals to trust promises in
circumstances in which that trust is socially beneficial"); see also Vickory, supra note 4,
at 118-19 (recognizing that certain considerations should prevent a "harshly inflexible
application of the employment at-will doctrine" when an employer who verbally
promises lifetime employment breaches that promise).
197. See infra Part IV.D (discussing valid premises of permanent employment and
reasons supporting their enforcement).
198. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1351.
199. See supra notes 144-154 and accompanying text (discussing why death would
complete performance of the contract within one year).
200. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1351.
201. See supra notes 172-178 and accompanying text.
202. See Warner v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 164 U.S. 418, 434 (1896). The court
noted that
[tihe parties may well have expected that the contracts would continue in force
for more than one year, it may have been very improbable that it would not do
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prevailing rule in Illinois establishes that the slightest possibility of full
performance within one year places an oral contract outside the
statute.203 Second, many Illinois state courts, as well as the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, advocate the examination of a contract's
precise terms to assess whether the happening of a certain event would
complete performance of the contract, thus exempting the contract
from the statute of frauds; or, whether the event would impede the
performance of the contract, thus placing the contract within the statute
of frauds' writing requirement.204
Furthermore, a plain reading of the statute clearly shows that the
one-year clause requires both parties to agree that the "agreement...
is not to be performed," not that the agreement "is not at all likely to be
performed," nor that the agreement "may not be performed., 205 This
literal construction does not frustrate the purpose behind the statute of
frauds, and is consistent with the purpose behind the judicial
exceptions.2° Many courts had adopted these exceptions in an effort
to significantly narrow the use of the statute as a shield to fraud.20 7
Thus, because a plain reading is consistent with the judiciary's efforts
to prevent the statute from being used to perpetrate fraud, the statute of
frauds' one year clause should be read narrowly.2'
so; and it did in fact continue in force for a much longer time. But they made
no stipulation, which in terms, or by reasonable inference, required that result.
The question is not what the probable, or expected, or actual performance of
the contract was ....
Id.
203. See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of the
one-year exception and the meaning of "performance").
204. See Taylor v. Canteen Corp., 69 F.3d 773, 785 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Lamaster
v. Chicago & Northeast I1l. Dist. Council of Carpenters Apprentice & Trainee Program,
766 F. Supp. 1497, 1506-09 (N.D. Iii. 1991)); see also supra notes 144-154 and
accompanying text (providing a discussion of judicial interpretations of "performance"
and the meaning of "capability of performance").
205. Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1354 (Nickels, J., dissenting) (quoting CORBIN, supra
note 90, § 444, at 534).
206. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the
statute of frauds and its exceptions). The Mclnerney dissent also noted that even if the
court had been required to look beyond the language of the statute, it did "not find the
majority's policy analysis to be persuasive justification for the broad construction it
gives the statute." Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1354 (Nickels, J., dissenting).
207. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1351. Although these exceptions have not been
added to the statute of frauds, the United States Supreme Court has interpreted
congressional silence and inaction to a judicial interpretation to mean that Congress has
acquiesced. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268-69 (1992). Evans holds that
in light of a silent and informed legislature, "[olur conclusion is buttressed by the fact
that so many other courts that have considered this issue over the last [twenty] years
have interpreted the statute in the same way." Id. (footnote and citations omitted).
208. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1354 (Nickels, J., dissenting) (citing CALAMARI
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In addition, the dissent correctly noted that the one-year clause does
not prevent the dangers of "stale evidence and faded memories.""0 9
For example, the evidence and testimonies for six-month contracts will
remain unprotected where the employee files a breach of contract claim
almost five years later and the case is not resolved by a court or jury
for another few years.1
B. Both the Majority and Dissent Fail to Recognize Full Performance
Charter Golf's promise should have been enforced because
Mclnerney fully performed his obligations under the contract.21 , The
facts unequivocally show that Mclnerney's obligations were to reject
the competitor's job offer and to continue to work for Charter Golf.21 2
Mclnerney did not promise to work at Charter Golf for the rest of his
life, nor did Charter Golf bargain for that promise.21 3 The Illinois
Supreme Court realized this fact when it rejected the Charter Golf's
argument that the contract was unenforceable because it lacked
"mutuality of obligation. ' ' 214  Although the majority admittedly
recognized that Mclnerney had only promised to reject the other offer
and to continue work, the majority later blatantly ignored this
conclusion and misconstrued Mclnerney's promise to mean that he
was required to work until his death.2 5  The dissent completely
& PERILLO, supra note 172, § 19-17, at 807). The one-year clause produces inconsistent
results and does "not achieve a logical balance between protecting against the
enforcement of fraudulently alleged promises and, at the same time, withholding aid to
promise-breakers." Vickory, supra note 4, at 99 (noting that "the 'one-year' rule...
has long been interpreted narrowly; enforcement of an oral contract depends on the mere
possibility of its performance within one year ... ").
209. Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1354 (Nickels, J., dissenting). "[T]he one-year
provision does not effectively guard against these dangers because '[tihere is no
necessary relationship between the time of the making of the contract, the time within
which its performance is required and the time when it might come to court to be
proven."' Id. (quoting CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 172, § 19-17, at 807 (quoting D
& N Boening, Inc. v. Kirsch Beverages, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 992, 993 (N.Y. 1984))).
210. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-205 (West 1996) (stating a five-year statute of
limitations for actions on unwritten contracts and other civil actions not otherwise
provided). A breach of contract action for unwritten employment contracts must be
brought within five years. See Harry Goldstine Realty Co. v. City of Chicago, 29
N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940).
211. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text (discussing the full
performance doctrine). But see Tabora v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., 664 N.E.2d 267, 276
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (holding that the mere acceptance of past offers of two-year
reappointments did not constitute partial performance).
212. See McInerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1349.
213. See id. at 1349, 1351.
214. Id. at 1350-51.
215. See id. at 1351 (acknowledging that Mclnerney could terminate the employment
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neglected to recognize the majority's inconsistent conclusions of fact
and law.21 6
Mclnerney fully completed his obligations to the contract. 2 7 He
rejected the competitor's job offer and continued to work for three
years.18 Therefore, the complete performance exception to the statute
of frauds should have applied and excused the absence of a writing. 2'9
C. Use of Promissory Estoppel Doctrine-Still a Gray Area
The Illinois Supreme Court confused the issue of whether
promissory estoppel could trump the statute of frauds. While the court
concluded that it would follow the Sinclair rule, which prohibits
invoking promissory estoppel against the statute of frauds,22 ° the court
appeared to soften that rule by examining Mclnerney's reliance
interests. 21' The court recognized the Second Restatement rule
whereby promissory estoppel can be used in cases where a party
would be without any other remedy and there would be some kind of
unjust enrichment.222 Despite this recognition, the court wrongly
refused to apply this rule to Mclnerney's case.
The court erroneously found that Mclnerney had been fully
compensated for his services and the "sole injustice ... [wa]s his
employer's failure to honor its promise of lifetime employment. ' 2 3 In
addition, the court unfairly chided Mclnerney for failing to know that
an oral promise was unenforceable under the statute of frauds.224
However, even if Mclnerney was a "sophisticated man of
commerce," 225 the reasonable employee, who wants to establish a
trusting and long-lasting relationship with his employer, may
appropriately refrain from asking for a promise in writing to avoid any
relationship at will); id. at 1352 (stating that full performance of the contract required
Mclnerney "to work until his death").
216. See id. at 1353-55 (Nickels, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 1349.
218. See id.
219. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
220. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1352; see also supra notes 112-13 and
accompanying text (discussing the Sinclair rule in detail).
221. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1352.
222. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139, cmt. c, at 355-56
(1981)). It appears that the Illinois Supreme Court may approve of this rule in some
instances because it stated: "[W]e do not believe that this case is one which requires us
to adopt such a rule." Id.
223. Id. at 1352-53.
224. See id. at 1353. The court found that Mclnerney's reliance on Charter Golf's
promise was "misplaced." Id.
225. Id.
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insult to the employer.226 Furthermore, Mclnerney's reliance was not
misplaced, but foreseeable and expected by Charter Golf.2 27 Though
he was compensated for his services, he was not fairly compensated
for rejecting a lucrative job offer with a competitor. 2' Despite these
facts, the court nonetheless concluded that his reliance was not enough
to adopt the Second Restatement rule, leaving some uncertainty as to
when the Second Restatement rule should be applied.
D. Valid Promises of Permanent Employment Should be Enforced
Instead of broadly ruling that all permanent employment contracts
require a writing because they anticipate a duration longer than one
year,229 the Illinois Supreme Court should have looked to the totality
of the circumstances in determining when a writing is needed."3 If the
circumstances surrounding the promise and the authority of the
promise-makers are sufficiently clear to establish the existence of
consideration to modify the at-will employment relationship, then the
oral promises should be enforced. 23' In Mclnerney, the employee's
relinquishment of another job offer for job security established a
credible lifetime employment contract232 and constituted complete
performance. 3 Thus, the form and substance necessary for a valid
and enforceable permanent employment contract had been met.234
226. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 926; see also Alan Hyde et al., After
Smyrna: Rights and Powers of Unions That Represent Less Than a Majority, 45 RUTGERS
L. REV. 637, 669 n.37 (1993) (citations omitted) (discussing the understanding of
employer-employee contracts as "genuine reflections of trust that typify modern
business enterprise").
227. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1349-50. The facts show that Mclnerney
relinquished a job offer for job security. See id. at 1349.
228. See id. at 1349-50.
229. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
230. See Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 939 (asserting that, if the surrounding
circumstances, the promisor's promises, and authority of the promisor are sufficiently
clear to establish consideration, the promise should be enforced); see also Maddux, supra
note 32, at 216 (noting that employee allegations of indefinite term contracts result in
fact questions to be addressed by the fact finder). In determining the time of
performance and applicability of the statute of frauds, the fact finder "must carefully
examine the subject matter and the circumstances surrounding the parties' situation
present at the time of the contract." Id. (quoting Gerstacker v. Blum Consulting Eng'rs,
Inc., 884 S.W.2d 845, 850 (Tex. App. Ct. 1994)).
23 1. Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 939.
232. See supra notes 131-142 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text (discussing the test for
determining whether a valid contract had been created) and notes 100-01 and
accompanying text (discussing enforcing an oral contract through the complete
performance exception).
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However, in its quest to protect employers from being liable for
their own loose verbal statements, or from an employee's fabricated
testimony, the court completely and unreasonably ignored the fact that
it had already found that Charter Golf's oral promise constituted a
valid permanent employment contract. 235 In allowing the statute of
frauds analysis to essentially render the at-will analysis nugatory,236
the court failed to explain how its decision promotes the purpose
behind the statute of frauds. 7 While it duly noted that the purpose of
the statute is to protect the fact finder "from charlatans, perjurers and
the problems of proof accompanying oral contracts, 238 the facts
clearly indicate that Mclnerney was not a charlatan or perjurer, and that
the consideration given was adequate proof of the oral contract.29
The majority failed to realize that its decision only helps perpetuate
fraud by protecting employers who break promises of job security
upon which employees reasonably rely. 240 Although protecting
employers from false allegations of permanent employment contracts
constitutes a legitimate concern, the court should have balanced that
concern with the corresponding crucial concern that the statute of
frauds itself is being used as a fraud against employees, who often are
already functioning at unequal bargaining levels.24
235. See Mclnerney v. Charter Golf, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 1347, 1350-51 (II!. 1997)
(concluding that where an "employee relinquishes something of value in a bargained-for
exchange for the employer's guarantee of permanent employment, a contract is
formed"); see supra Part III.B (discussing the Mclnerney majority holding).
236. See Vickory, supra note 4, at 116 (recognizing that at-will employment may be
overcome through an examination of the "entire relationship of the parties ... [in order
to] ascertain their actual intent. ) (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d
373, 386 (Co. 1988)).
237. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1351 (stating that "the statute exists to protect
not just the parties to a contract, but also-perhaps more importantly-to protect the fact
finder from charlatans, perjurers and the problems of proof accompanying oral
contracts"). The majority's assertion that enforcing an oral promise for lifetime
employment "would invite confusion, uncertainty, and outright fraud" is unsupported.
Id. at 1352. The dissent attempted to counter this point by stating that the majority's
holding is likely to increase uncertainty. See id. at 1355 (Nickels, J., dissenting)
(noting that parties would have to guess whether the type of contract they have will be
treated as "inherently anticipating a relationship of more than one year"). However, the
more effective argument is that requiring a writing here would lead to outright fraud by
protecting an employer's inducement. See infra notes 246-251 and accompanying text.
238. Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1351.
239. See id. at 1348-51.
240. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; infra notes 246-51 and
accompanying text (noting that under the Mclnerney holding, employers can revoke
oral offers of lifetime employment even though employees have relied on the offers).
241. See Maddux, supra note 32, at 200-01 (arguing that employment at will already
favors the employer and therefore, employees should have use of "every viable vehicle"
through which they can enforce an employer's promise).
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V. IMPACT
In Illinois, employees no longer have any legal rights to permanent
employment unless the promise is in writing.2 2 The Illinois Supreme
Court's decision in Mclnerney v. Charter Golf, Inc. essentially
eliminates all oral promises for lifetime employment, and leaves
employees who have relied upon these promises terminable at the will
of their employers.243 In doing so, the decision blatantly disregards
concerns of the employee's unprotected reliance interests and unequal
bargaining power,2 " setting forth a disturbing precedent that lower
Illinois courts must follow. The court also ignored the reality that
almost all employment relationships are created and memorialized by
words and actions, rather than by paper.2 45
The decision unfairly and unreasonably assists management in
performing acts of fraud by giving them absolute protection from
being sued for breaking valid oral promises for permanent
employment.' 4 This decision also gives the employer the ultimate,
non-negotiable right to revoke its offer of lifetime employment, despite
the fact that it was part of a bargained-for exchange.247 Consequently,
it leaves employees in the confusing and unreasonable position of not
knowing what promises they can actually rely upon and not knowing
whom to trust.248 The employee must now ask for all promised terms
for hiring and firing practices and procedures to be in writing.249 This
242. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1353. "[T]he statute of frauds requires that
contracts for lifetime employment be in writing." Id. "Permanent" is used here because
the court's rationale for requiring a writing was based on its description that a permanent
employment contract expects a long relationship, one longer than a year. See id. at
1352. The court further defined "lifetime" employment contracts as "permanent"
employment contracts. See id. at 1351-52.
243. See id. at 1353.
244. See infra notes 246-51 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
246. The decision will perpetuate fraud, a vital concern that the exceptions were
created to limit. See supra note 81 and accompanying text; see also Evans v. Fluor
Distribution Co., 799 F.2d 364, 366 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing the applicability of the
statute of frauds to a promise whose existence has been admitted by the employer).
247. See supra notes 131-42 and accompanying text (discussing the majority's
holding that there was bargained-for consideration.
248. See generally Farber & Matheson, supra note 2, at 905 (discussing the legal
policy to protect the ability of individuals to trust promises).
249. See Mclnerney, 680 N.E.2d at 1353. This Note recognizes that not every
employer will renege on the promise. Ironically, it is normally employers who are
advised to avoid overselling job security at the time of hire. See Vickory, supra note 4,
at 121. In Illinois, employers can verbally promise lifetime employment without worry
of liability because they will not be bound by oral promises. See McInerney, 680
N.E.2d at 1353.
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task may prove difficult, given the unequal bargaining power between
the employer and the employee, and could potentially breed distrust, or
offend an employer.25 It is possible that the employee may not even
be in a position to ask for a written contract at all. z"
The court's decision also causes confusion as to the application of
the at-will-employment doctrine to permanent contracts, given that the
use of the statute of frauds seems to render useless the court's first
determination that the contract was a valid permanent employment
contract.2 2 It no longer seems to matter whether the employee proves
that employment-at-will was not intended because an unwritten
permanent employment contract can be readily voided by the statute of
frauds. 25 3 Thus, the Mclnerney decision strengthens the at-will
employment doctrine by allowing employers to terminate employees
despite the existence of a valid lifetime employment contract, while
simultaneously making futile all analyses concerning the modification
of employment-at-will relationships into permanent employment
contracts.
VI. CONCLUSION
While requiring that permanent employment contracts be in writing
will certainly benefit both employer and employee, the Illinois
Supreme Court, in Mclnerney v. Charter Golf, Inc., failed to take
fairness and reality into consideration. Mclnerney provided the court
with the opportunity to establish that the totality of the circumstances
coupled with fairness considerations, should take precedence over
mere form. In fact, Mclnerney would have been an easy case to
resolve because the Court had already established that the promise
between Charter Golf and Mclnerney was an unequivocal permanent
employment contract supported by bargained-for consideration.
However, the Mclnerney majority instead found misplaced solace in
the statute of frauds. By misinterpreting the statutes' well-supported
exceptions, and even some of the facts of the case, it erroneously
justified reverting a valid permanent employment contract back to an
at-will employment agreement.
GINA M. CHANG
250. See generally Maddux, supra note 32, at 228 (discussing that the primary
argument for using promissory estoppel to prove oral promises of indefinite term
employment is to even the playing field between employers and employees).
251. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
253. See Part III.B.
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